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ABSTRACT
Going back at least to Duhem, there is a tradition of thinking that crucial experiments
are impossible in science. I analyse Duhem’s arguments and show that they are based
on the excessively strong assumption that only deductive reasoning is permissible in
experimental science. This opens the possibility that some principle of inductive inference
could provide a sufﬁcient reason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses on
the basis of an appropriately controlled experiment. To be sure, there are analogues
to Duhem’s problems that pertain to inductive inference. Using a famous experiment
from the history of molecular biology as an example, I show that an experimentalist
version of inference to the best explanation (IBE) does a better job in handling these
problems than other accounts of scientiﬁc inference. Furthermore, I introduce a concept
of experimental mechanism and show that it can guide inferences from data within an
IBE-based framework for induction.
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1 Introduction
Some of themajor discoveries in the history ofmolecular biology are associated
with an alleged ‘crucial experiment’ that is thought to have provided decisive
evidence for one among a group of hypotheses. A well-known example is the
Hershey–Chase experiment (1952), which showed that viral DNA, not protein,
enters a bacterial cell to reprogram it to make virus particles. Another example
is the ‘PaJaMo’ experiment (1958), which showed that a certain bacterial gene
produces a substance that represses the activity of other genes. In both cases,
there were two major hypotheses that could explain the facts known before-
hand: Either viral protein or viral DNA contains the information for making
new virus particles (Hershey–Chase). Similarly, either ‘generalized induction’
(in the molecular biological, not logical sense!) or suppression of a repressor
(the ‘double bluff’ theory of Leo Szilard) was thought to be responsible for
the regulation of sugar metabolism in bacteria (PaJaMo). Examples such as
these abound in experimental biology (see Weber [2005], Chapters 3–5). In
many cases, a single experiment seems to have enabled a choice between the
competing hypotheses at hand, thus strongly resembling Bacon’s ‘instances of
the ﬁngerpost’ or Newton’s ‘experimentum crucis’.
Philosophers of science, of course, have been less than enthusiastic about the
possibility of crucial experiments.1 Following Duhem ([1954]), many seem to
think that a single experiment, as a matter of principle, is not able to choose
among a group of hypotheses. However, as I will show, Duhemmade extremely
strong assumptions concerning the kind of inferences that are to be permitted.
Namely, he allowed only deductive inferences to be used. In this paper, I will
show that when crucial experiments are construed along the lines of induc-
tive (ampliative) inference, Duhem’s arguments become less persuasive. Even
though there are analogues to Duhem’s problems in the realm of inductive in-
ference, these are solvable within the framework of a theory of induction based
on inference to the best explanation.
I want to demonstrate the possibility of crucial experiments on a concrete
historical example from molecular biology, namely the Meselson–Stahl experi-
ment done in 1957. Even though there is an extremely detailed historical study
of this experiment available (Holmes [2001]), it has tomy knowledge never been
subjected to a thorough methodological analysis.2 ‘The most beautiful experi-
ment in biology,’ as it has been called, is widely thought to have demonstrated
semi-conservative replication of DNA as predicted by Watson and Crick in
1 An exception is Franklin ([2007]).
2 Brief methodological discussions of the case can be found in (Franklin [2007], Section E.2) and
in (Roush [2005], pp. 14–6). Franklin uses it to highlight the importance of intervention and
experimental control. Roush uses the episode to illustrate her tracking account of evidence.
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1953. But it remains to be shown that this experiment was actually decisive
from a methodological point of view.
In Section 2, I will discuss Duhem’s infamous arguments against crucial
experiments. Section 3 provides a brief account of the Meselson–Stahl experi-
ment and some of the theoretical controversies that preceded it. In Section 4, I
show that the evidential import of this experiment cannot be accounted for by
a simple elimination scheme. In Section 5, I argue that the experiment cannot
be viewed as a severe test as prescribed by the error-statistical approach to
scientiﬁc inference. In Section 6, I propose an experimentalist version of infer-
ence to the best explanation (IBE) and show that it provides the most adequate
reconstruction of the experiment as providing strong evidence for the semi-
conservative hypothesis. My account is based on the idea that explanations in
experimental biology often involve more or less detailed descriptions of mech-
anisms, which is substantiated by much recent scholarship (e.g., Machamer,
Darden, and Craver [2000]; Bechtel [2005]; Darden [2006]; Craver [2007]). I
add to these accounts the concept of an experimental mechanism and analyse
the role of such mechanisms in making inferences from data (Sections 6.1 and
6.2).
The main reason why IBE provides the best account of the Meselson–Stahl
experiment, I will argue, is that it does a better job in dealing with the inductive
analogues of Duhem’s problems. One is the problem of untested auxiliaries,
treated in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, while the other is very similar to van Fraassen’s
‘bad lot’ objection to IBE, discussed in Section 7. In Section 8, I brieﬂy discuss
the relationship of my IBE-based account to Bayesian conﬁrmation theory.
2 Duhem on the Logic of Crucial Experiments
Duhem characterized crucial experiments as follows:
Do you wish to obtain from a group of phenomena a theoretically certain
and indisputable explanation? Enumerate all the hypotheses that can be
made to account for this group of phenomena; then, by experimental con-
tradiction eliminate all except one; the latter will no longer be a hypothesis,
but will become a certainty (Duhem [1954], p. 188).
This passage strongly suggests that Duhem thought of crucial experiments in
terms of eliminative induction, in other words, in terms of the following logical
scheme3:
1. H1 ∨ H2
2. H1 ⇒ e
3 I reconstruct the logical scheme for two hypotheses. It is obvious how it could be expanded for
more than two.
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3. H2 ⇒¬e
4. e
5. From (3), (4): ¬H2 [by modus tollens]
6. From (1), (5): H1 [by disjunctive syllogism]
Such a train of inference faces two major problems according to Duhem.
The ﬁrst problem is the one that is today known as ‘Duhem’s problem’. This
is the problem that auxiliary assumptions are needed to secure the deductive
relation between hypothesis and evidence. Therefore, (5) will never involve a
hypothesis alone; it will always be a conjunction of hypotheses that can be said
to be falsiﬁed. Famously:
The only thing the experiment teaches us is that among the propositions
used to predict the phenomenon and to establish whether it would be
produced, there is at least one error; but where this error lies is just what it
does not tell us (ibid., p. 185).
But if the falsity of one of the hypotheses at issue cannot be asserted, the
inference (6) does not go through. As if this weren’t enough, Duhem identiﬁes
a second problem:
Between two contradictory theorems of geometry there is no room for
a third judgment; if one is false, the other is necessarily true. Do two
hypotheses in physics ever constitute such a strict dilemma? Shall we ever
dare to assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable? Lightmay be a swarm
of projectiles, or it may a vibratory motion whose waves are propagated in
a medium; is it forbidden to be anything else at all? (ibid., p. 190).
The answer to the latter, rather rhetorical question is clear: Unlike math-
ematicians, physicists can never have grounds for assuming that they have
exhausted the space of possible truths. In other words, there can be no warrant
for a premise such as (1) in the scheme above.
Given what he sets out to prove, Duhem’s arguments are impeccable. But
note that Duhem is clearly thinking in terms of deductive inference. What he
proves is that experiments conjoined with deductive logic, together, are unable
to bring about a decision for one among a group of hypotheses. Of course,
he is absolutely right about that. However, Duhem’s arguments do not touch
the possibility of inductive or ampliative inference enabling such a choice.4 An
4 Of course, the possibility of inductive inferences is not something that Duhem simply overlooked;
he provided elaborate arguments against inductivism (mostly using Newtonian mechanics as an
example). I lack the space to discuss these here.
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ampliative inference rule might very well be able to mark one hypothesis as the
preferable one.5
This proposal raises the question if such a procedure does not run into
similar difﬁculties. It would seem that Duhem’s ﬁrst problem concerns only
the possibility of refuting hypotheses. On the account that I shall give, crucial
experiments do not refute the alternatives. Instead, they positively select one
of the hypotheses as best supported by the evidence. Therefore, Duhem’s ﬁrst
problem in its classic form seems to be irrelevant. Even so, it is clearly the
case that a crucial experiment relies on auxiliary assumptions. If these are false,
there can be no evidential support. False auxiliaries could mask the truth or the
falsity of a hypothesis under test. While it might be possible to independently
test some auxiliaries (see Section 6.4), it is never possible to test all of them.
The reason is that each attempted test of an auxiliary assumption will require
further assumptions, and so on. If we require that all auxiliaries be tested,
there will never be any conclusive evidential support from an experiment. This
is the analogue of Duhem’s ﬁrst problem that arises within my framework. I
shall refer to it as the ‘problem of untested auxiliaries’. In Section 6.3, I will
show how the problem can be solved within an IBE-based framework.
As for Duhem’s second problem, it is no less relevant for inductive inference
as it is for Duhem’s deductive inference scheme, at least if inductive inference is
to be truth-tropic. When scientists hold a hypothesis to be true on the grounds
that it is the one from a group that is best supported by the evidence, they
must have grounds for claiming that there are no better ones that they have
not considered. If no such grounds can be had, then an inductive inference
regime runs into exactly the same problem as Duhem’s eliminative scheme.
This, put into the context of a speciﬁc inductive principle, namely IBE, is Bas
van Fraassen’s ‘bad lot’-argument.6 I shall deal with it in Section 7.
As this discussion reveals, we can expect an inductive selection regime for
hypotheses to run into an analogue of Duhem’s ﬁrst problem, and another
problem that is basically Duhem’s second. I shall address these problems in
due course. But right now, it is time to introduce my historical example.
3 ‘The Most Beautiful Experiment in Biology’
As is well known, James D. Watson and Francis H. C. Crick closed their
landmark paper on the structure of DNA with the short and crisp remark ‘It
5 A similar claim can be found in (Laudan [1990]). Duhem-type problems (and their Quinean
relatives) are often discussed under the rubric of ‘underdetermination of theory by the evidence.’
However, this expression is ambiguous, as Laudan shows. This is why I prefer to develop the
problem in terms of a reply to Duhem’s classic arguments.
6 Van Fraassen discussed this problem speciﬁcally as a part of his argument against IBE.
Stanford ([2006]) offers a more general and systematic discussion of what he calls ‘the prob-
lem of unconceived alternatives’ and its epistemological ramiﬁcations.
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has not escaped our notice that the speciﬁc base pairing we have postulated
immediately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material’
(Watson and Crick [1953]). It is fairly obvious what Watson and Crick had
in mind: Because of the complementarity of the base sequences of the two
nucleotide chains in the double helix, a DNA molecule could be copied by ﬁrst
separating the two strands, and then synthesizing two new strands using the two
old strands as templates.On this scheme, eachnewly synthesizedDNAmolecule
will contain one strand that was already present in the parental molecule, and
one newly made strand. This scheme is called ‘semi-conservative replication.’
However, as plausible as this scheme might seem, sceptics were quick to notice
some theoretical difﬁculties. Here is the greatest of them all, Max Delbru¨ck:
I am willing to bet that the complementarity idea is correct, on the basis of
the base analysis data and because of the implication regarding replication.
Further, I am willing to bet that the plectonemic coiling of the chains in
your structure is radically wrong, because (1) the difﬁculties of untangling
the chains do seem, after all, insuperable to me. (2) The X-ray data suggest
only coiling but not speciﬁcally your kind of coiling (Delbru¨ck to Watson,
12 May 1953, quoted from Holmes [2001], pp. 21–2).
The term ‘plectonemic’ referred to the topological property that, according
to Watson and Crick, two DNA strands are twisted about each other so that
they cannot be separated without uncoiling. The ‘base analysis data’ refer
to the work of Erwin Chargaff, who had shown previously that the building
blocks of DNA occur in certain ﬁxed ratios. Delbru¨ck is also pointing out
that the double helix was, at the time when Watson and Crick proposed it,
strongly underdetermined by the available X-ray diffraction data (i.e., other
coiled structures would have been consistent with these data).
But Delbru¨ck not only expressed scepticism about the speciﬁc kind of coil-
ing. His point (1) also called into question the whole idea of a semi-conservative
replication mechanism as suggested by Watson and Crick. The problem was
that, given the plectonemic topology of the double helix, untangling the two
strands requires the breaking and rejoining of the sugar–phosphate backbone
of the molecule. Given the fast rate by which DNA replicates, especially in
rapidly dividing bacterial cells, the molecule would have to rotate at mind-
boggling velocities.7 This was also known as the ‘problem of untwiddling’. For
a while, it was amajor source of scepticism aboutWatson andCrick’s extremely
elegant solution. While the structure itself became rapidly accepted thanks to
7 Today, it is known that this is actually what happens. There is a whole class of enzymes called
topoisomerases that control the coiling of the DNA molecule. These enzymes can catalyze
extremely fast breaking and re-joining of the sugar–phosphate backbone ofDNA. Some enzymes
can even introduce rotational strain into the molecule under the expenditure of metabolic energy.
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Figure 1. Delbru¨ck’s dispersive mechanism (Delbru¨ck [1954], p. 786). The solid
lines represent parental DNA strands, the dotted lines newly synthesized material.
Reprinted with publisher’s permission.
the available of improved X-ray data, the semi-conservative replication mech-
anism continued to be doubtful for the years to come.
In the years following Watson and Crick’s announcement, two alternative
replicationmechanisms were proposed. Delbru¨ck ([1954]) devised a scheme un-
der which each newly synthesized DNA molecule contains bits of the parental
molecule that are interspersed with newly synthesized material (Figure 1). This
became known as the dispersive mechanism.
Gunther Stent ([1958]) proposed that the whole double-stranded DNA
molecule could serve as the template for synthesizing a copy (Figure 2). This
would not require any untwisting of the parental molecule.
According to this mechanism, which was called the conservativemechanism,
the parentalmolecule emerges unchanged from the replication processwhile the
newly synthesized molecules contain only new material. The three mechanisms
differwith respect to the distributionof parental andnewly synthesizedmaterial
that end up in the daughter molecules. Thus, in the mid-1950s there were
three different hypotheses concerning the distribution of parental and newly
synthesized nucleic acid chains.
Now enter two young experimentalists, MatthewMeselson and Frank Stahl,
working at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena. Using a power-
ful analytic ultracentrifuge, they performed a remarkable experiment in 1957.8
8 See (Holmes [2001]) for an extremely detailed account. As usual, this experiment was preceded
by a long and painstaking series of failures and cul-de-sacs. Holmes, who had the complete lab
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Figure 2. Stent’s conservative hypothesis (Stent [1958], p. 137), showing a newDNA
strand being synthesized in themajor groove of the parental double helix. Reprinted
with publisher’s permission.
Meselson and Stahl grew E. coli bacteria in the presence of a heavy isotope of
nitrogen, nitrogen-15. Ordinarily, DNA contains the most common isotope of
nitrogen, which is nitrogen-14. But when grown in the presence of nitrogen-15,
the bacteria incorporate the heavy nitrogen into their DNA. Now, DNA that
contains the ordinary, light nitrogen atoms and the DNA containing heavy
nitrogen can be distinguished by their weight. Of course, DNA does not occur
in large enough quantities to be weighed by an ordinary balance. But Meselson
and Stahl developed a highly precise instrument for determining the weight of
DNA. They ﬁrst dissolved the bacterial cells in a strong detergent. Then they
placed the extract in a very dense solution of the salt CsCl. When a CsCl solu-
tion is centrifuged at very high speed in an ultracentrifuge formany hours, it will
form a density gradient after a while. At equilibrium, the DNA molecules will
ﬂoat in that region of the gradient that corresponds to their own density. They
form a band that can be observed with the help of UV light. Thus, the weight of
the DNA molecules can be measured by determining the position of the band.
The experiment thatMeselson and Stahl now did was to transfer the bacteria
from a medium containing heavy nitrogen to a medium containing light nitro-
gen and allowing the bacteria to multiply further. At regular time intervals
records available and conducted extensive interviews with the two scientists, traces the progress
of Meselson’s and Stahl’s work on a day-to-day basis.
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Figure 3. UV absorption photographs (left) and densitometric scans (right) of the
ultracentrifuge cell (Meselson and Stahl [1958], p. 675). The bands show where
the DNA ﬂoats in the CsCl density gradient. What is particularly important about
these data is that the band of intermediate density was located exactly in between
the heavy and light bands. As both theoretical calculations and measurements
showed, the density gradient was very nearly linear in the range where the DNA
was ﬂoating (see Section 6.4). This allowed the inference that the intermediate band
containedmolecules that were composed of heavy and light nitrogen exactly in a 1:1
ratio, as predicted by the semi-conservative hypothesis. Reprinted with publisher’s
permission.
after the transfer, they took samples and placed them in the ultracentrifuge.
What they observed is that after one generation, a band of intermediate density
appeared. After another generation, the intermediate band was still present,
but a new band that corresponded to light DNA appeared (Figure 3). An ob-
vious interpretation of this pattern was that the band of intermediate density
consisted of hybrid molecules composed of one heavy and one light strand
(see Figures 4 and 5). Such a hybrid could obviously have been produced by
the semi-conservative scheme, according to which each newly produced double
helix preserves one strand from the parental molecule. In contrast, the conser-
vative mechanism should not produce a band of intermediate density (but see
Section 4). According to the dispersive mechanism, the result would look the
same after one generation, but the band should shift further after subsequent
rounds of replication, as the molecules would lose the heavy nitrogen bit by bit
over the generations. But there were no such shifts.
While it might seem obvious that these data supported the semi-conservative
scheme best, there are methodological complications that I will discuss in the
following sections. At any rate, the impact of this experiment on the scientiﬁc
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Figure 4. What the data showed according to Meselson and Stahl ([1958], p.
677). The shaded areas represent heavy nitrogen (15N). Reprinted with publisher’s
permission.
Figure 5. The most obvious interpretation of why the nitrogen was distributed as
shown in Figure 4 (Meselson and Stahl [1958], p. 678). Reprinted with publisher’s
permission.
community at that time was considerable. Almost everyone agreed that the
Meselson–Stahl experiment beautifully demonstrates semi-conservative repli-
cation. The only exception known to me is Max Delbru¨ck, but his role in the
closely knit molecular biology of that time seems to have been that of advocatus
diaboli.
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In the following sections, I shall provide a methodological analysis of this
experiment and its evidential support forWatson andCrick’s semi-conservative
mechanism. It will turn out that the case is much more complex than it might
seem at ﬁrst sight.
4 Why Not Simple Elimination?
The question that I shall address ﬁrst is why we cannot simply say that the semi-
conservative scheme was the only one to survive the test to which Meselson
and Stahl subjected it, while the alternative schemes were falsiﬁed and therefore
eliminated. After all, the semi-conservative model predicted the outcome for
this experiment correctly, while the two alternatives did not. The ﬁrst thing to
note is that this would amount to an eliminative induction, which is exactly the
kind of reasoning that is not possible according to Duhem (see Section 2). If
we construe the experimental reasoning like this, both of Duhem’s objections
can be raised. Here, I shall concentrate on Duhem’s ﬁrst problem.
In a Duhemian frame of mind, it could be argued that the dispersive and
conservative hypotheses could still have been true because one or several auxil-
iary assumptions might have been false. For example, it could be thatMeselson
and Stahl were wrong about the molecular units that they resolved in their
ultracentrifuge. Technically, what the centrifuge data showed is merely that
there are three colloidal substances of different density. It does not show that
these substances were simple DNA duplexes. In other words, the identiﬁcation
of the pattern shown in Figure 4 with the molecular entities shown in Figure 5
was a theoretical interpretation of the data.
This interpretation could have been false. The problem is especially acute
because it is known today that Meselson and Stahl were mistaken about the
length of the molecules they saw ﬂoating in their gradients. The hypoder-
mic needles that Meselson and Stahl used to load the DNA onto the gradi-
ent must have mechanically sheared the DNA molecules into much smaller
pieces—unbeknownst to these scientists in 1957.9 This did not alter the result
because the CsCl-gradient technique separates DNA molecules according to
density, not length. But this does show that there were severely mistaken as-
sumptions about the experimental system. Meselson and Stahl were lucky that
their mistake concerning length was not relevant. But what guaranteed that all
the salient auxiliary assumptions were correct?
As these historical facts make clear, there would have been ample reason
for defenders of the alternative hypotheses to blame Meselson’s and Stahl’s
auxiliary assumptions rather than their preferred model. In fact, Meselson and
Stahl, on their part, were quite cautious in stating their conclusions:
9 (Hanawalt [2004]). Thanks to Beatrix Rubin for bringing this paper to my attention.
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The structure for DNA proposed by Watson and Crick brought forward a
number of proposals as to how such a molecule might replicate [the semi-
conservative, dispersive and conservative mechanisms] These proposals
make speciﬁc predictions concerning the distribution of parental atoms
among progenymolecules. The results presented here give a detailed answer
to the question of this distribution and simultaneously direct our attention
to other problems whose solution must be the next step in progress toward
a complete understanding of the molecular basis of DNA duplication.
What are the molecular structures of the subunits of E. coli DNA which
are passed on intact to each daughter molecule?What is the relationship of
these subunits to each other in a DNA molecule? What is the mechanism
of the synthesis and dissociation of the subunits in vivo? (Meselson and
Stahl [1958], p. 681).
As this passage makes clear, Meselson and Stahl did not even draw the
inference from their data to the semi-conservative mechanism, at least not in
their ofﬁcial publication. Curiously, the questions they raise toward the end
of this passage are precisely those that their experiment is supposed to have
answered. In print, Meselson and Stahl did obviously not want to go beyond
what their data said.10 However, unofﬁcially they showed less caution.Meselson
sent J. D. Watson a little poem11:
Now 15N by heavy trickery/Ends the sway of Watson-Crickery./But now
we have WC with a mighty vengeance . . . or else a diabolical camouﬂage.
This line strongly suggests that Meselson did think that the experiment sup-
portedWatson’s and Crick’s replication scheme, even though he knew that they
had not really established the nature of themolecular units that they resolved in
their ultracentrifuge. As Holmes ([2001], p. 329) reports, ‘Meselson and Stahl
were personally convinced that the experiment had proven the position that
10 While the conclusive refutation of Stent’s model would have required more certainty about the
nature of themolecular units resolvedby the centrifuge,Meselson andStahlwere at least conﬁdent
enough that their results ruled out Delbru¨ck’s dispersive mechanism ([1958], p. 681). However,
they did not justify this claim on the grounds that the intermediate band did not shift any further
after subsequent rounds of replication (as most textbooks have it). Rather, they reported an
additional experiment with heat-denatured E. coli-DNA as speaking against Delbru¨ck. When
heated enough, the two strands of DNA dissociate. Meselson and Stahl denatured heavy, hybrid,
and light molecules in this way and analyzed them in the ultracentrifuge. The hybrid molecule
produced bands of the same density as a mixture of heavy and light DNA. Furthermore, the
molecular weight of the molecules was estimated to be reduced by half by denaturing. This
suggested that the DNA strands themselves were not broken and re-annealed during replication
(as Delbru¨ck’s mechanism required). However, Meselson and Stahl were worried because their
E. coli DNA dissociated at a temperature at which salmon sperm DNA did not, which led them
to wonder if E. coli-DNA might be ‘a more complex structure’ than salmon sperm DNA. (To
my knowledge, this could simply be due to a greater GC content in salmon sperm DNA.) At
any rate, this only shows again that there were serious doubts as to what the exact nature of the
molecular units was that the density gradient resolved. I will show below that this did not affect
the evidential import as regards the Watson–Crick scheme (Section 6.2).
11 Meselson to Watson, 8 November 1957. Quoted from (Holmes [2001], pp. 327–8).
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Watson and Crick had taken in 1953 to be right.’ As they had been quite scep-
tical of the Watson–Crick hypothesis initially, the experiment seems to have
had an impact on their degrees of belief.
Of course, the scientists’ own methodological judgments cannot be our ulti-
mate standardwhen engaging in normative philosophy of science.Nevertheless,
we should not dismiss these judgments lightly. I take part of my task to be the
explication or rational reconstruction of the scientists’ own reasoning. Thus,
I would like to show that there is a way of making sense of the apparent dis-
crepancy between Meselson and Stahl’s ofﬁcial view that they expressed in
the conclusion of their PNAS paper, according to which the experiment only
showed the equal distribution of parental nitrogen and not semi-conservative
replication, and their unofﬁcial view, which granted their own experimentmuch
more discriminatory power.
The reasons might have to do with the control of inductive risk. In print,
scientists will take as little inductive risk as possible in order to minimize the
chance of being on the record for being wrong. But on other occasions they
might be willing to take more inductive risk and go a little further beyond what
their data say, especially when this allows them to carry on with their research.
The alternative replication models (or at least the conservative model; see
footnote 10) could not be refuted then because there was an important untested
auxiliary assumption in the interpretation of the data: that the molecular units
represented as bands were single DNA molecules (and not, for example, end-
to-end associations of heavy parental duplexes with newly synthesized, light
double strands). The evidence for semi-conservative replication was only as
good as this assumption. This is the inductive analogue of Duhem’s ﬁrst prob-
lemmentioned in Section 2, the problem of untested auxiliaries. And this is also
why the simple eliminative induction scheme fails to bring out the evidential
import of this experiment.
It should be clear by now that, if we want to be able to explicate Meselson’s
and Stahl’s view that the experiment in its original formwas strong evidence for
the Watson–Crick mechanism, we must grapple with the problem of untested
auxiliaries. Before I present my own IBE-based solution, I shall examine how
another theory of scientiﬁc evidence handles this problem.
5 Severe Testing
PerhapsMeselson’s hintwith the ‘diabolical camouﬂage’ (see the above citation)
is revealing. It indicates that Meselson thought it unlikely in the extreme that
their experimentwould have turned out theway it did had the semi-conservative
hypothesis been false. This suggests yet another construal of the case: It could
be argued that what Meselson and Stahl actually provided was a severe test in
the sense of Mayo’s ([1996]) error-statistical theory of scientiﬁc reasoning.
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A severe test in this sense is a test with a low error probability, in other
words, a low probability that the hypothesis passes a test in spite of being false.
The term ‘error probability’ is originally a technical term from the Neyman–
Pearson statistical method. However, Mayo ([1996]) argues that there is an
informal analogue to such a test that also applies in non-statistical contexts.
The centrepiece of this informal approach is what Mayo calls ‘arguments from
error’. On her view, a hypothesis receives inductive support from some data
to the extent in which it ﬁts these data and some investigative procedure that
was likely to detect an erroneous ﬁt (i.e., one where the hypothesis under test is
false) did not ﬁnd an error.
A ﬁrst problem with such a construal is to say what justiﬁes the judgment
that some test procedure was likely to ﬁnd an error, had there been one. Speciﬁ-
cally, how couldMeselson’s judgment be justiﬁed that it was unlikely that DNA
would behave as it did, had the semi-conservative scheme been false? I cannot
think of a better answer than just saying that it would be a strange coincidence
if Meselson’s and Stahl’s experiment behaved as if a semi-conservative mecha-
nism was at work while, in fact, there was some other physiological mechanism
at work. But this is just another way of expressing the intuition that this was
unlikely; it does not really give a justiﬁcation for it. Therefore, I think a recon-
struction of the case as a severe test with an argument from error is not really
helpful (unlike in cases where a formal Neyman–Pearson statistical test can be
done).
But there is a second problem, and this is that there are major potential
errors in the original experiment that Meselson and Stahl were not able to rule
out in 1957. As already mentioned (Section 4), what the experiment showed
primarily was the symmetrical distribution of heavy nitrogen in replication,
not that the bands corresponded to single DNA duplexes. It was technically
possible that the intermediate band represents an end-to-end association of
parental DNA duplexes with newly synthesized duplexes rather than hybrid
molecules composed of a light and a heavy strand (this would make the results
compatible with the conservative hypothesis). This interpretation was ruled
out about ﬁve years later, when Meselson’s student Ron Rolfe showed that the
DNA could be broken into smaller fragments by sonication without affecting
its density (Hanawalt [2004]).
According to the error-statistical approach, an experimental inquiry only
supports a hypothesis to the extent in which it rules out possible errors in the
data interpretation. Meselson and Stahl were unable to rule out some quite
severe errors; therefore, this approach does not allow us to say that they had
good evidence for the Watson–Crick hypothesis. Of course, a follower of the
severe testing approach could just shrug her shoulders at this point and say:
Well, in that case there really was no decisive evidence coming out of the
Meselson–Stahl experiment, at least until Rolfe’s results were in.
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The problem with this way of arguing is not merely that it does not reﬂect
how many scientists thought about the experiment, including Meselson and
Stahl themselves. The real problem is that it will never allow us to say that the
experiment supported theWatson–Crick hypothesis; even once some additional
tests had been done. Consider Rolfe’s experiment, mentioned above. It might
be viewed as ruling out the error of misidentifying the molecular units that
worried Meselson and Stahl so much. However, it is always possible to come
upwith an interpretation ofRolfe’s data thatmake them compatible with one of
the alternative hypotheses. Perhaps there were covalent cross-links between the
parental and newly synthesized duplexes that were resistant to the sonication
treatment. So Rolfe’s data were no severe test before these other possible errors
were ruled out, and so on. When is the point reached where the data speak of
the truth of a hypothesis? There are always possible errors, so the jury is never
really in. For this reason, it seems to me that the error-statistical approach, far
from solving Duhem’s problem, makes it run amok.
The last two sections, I hope, have made it clear that we need to think about
theMeselson–Stahl experiment in altogether different terms if we want to show
that it was, in fact, strong evidence for the semi-conservative hypothesis.
6 An Experimentalist Version of IBE
I suggest that the Meselson–Stahl experiment selects the semi-conservative
hypothesis by an inference to the best explanation (IBE).12 In order to make
this thesis good, I ﬁrst need to elaborate on the relevant concept of scientiﬁc
explanation. For the purposes of this paper, I shall adopt amechanistic account
of explanation. According to such an account, to explain a phenomenonmeans
to describe a mechanism that produces this phenomenon. A highly inﬂuential
account of the relevant concept of mechanism has been given by Machamer,
Darden, and Craver ([2000]), who deﬁne mechanisms as ‘entities and activities
organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-
up conditions to ﬁnish or termination conditions’. A considerable body of
scholarship exists now that shows how much experimental research in biology
is organized around mechanisms in this sense (e.g., Bechtel [2005]; Darden
12 See (Lipton [2004]) for a deep book-length philosophical study of IBE. Lipton’s main example
is Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause of childbed fever. This is a case where IBE was used to
pinpoint a causal factor (‘cadaveric matter’) that accounted for variations in the incidence of
an infectious disease. Even though there was some controlled experimentation involved in this
example, the case differs considerably from my example of molecular biology. One difference is
that my example involves not merely the identiﬁcation of a causal factor, but also the elucidation
of a speciﬁc mechanism. Another difference is the use of a sophisticated measurement device.
Problems such as Duhem’s ﬁrst and its inductive analogue (not discussed by Lipton) are more
pressing here.
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[2006]; Craver [2007]).13 To my knowledge, no one has yet shown how such an
account of explanation could support an IBE-based account of induction.14
In order to do this, a new distinction is needed: I shall distinguish physiolog-
ical from experimental mechanisms.
6.1 Physiological and experimental mechanisms
Physiological mechanisms are mechanisms that operate in a living cell. This
kind of mechanism has received much attention lately. I would like to introduce
a new type of mechanism: experimental mechanisms. In doing so, I shall leave
the meaning of the term ‘mechanism’ itself the same, but allow the entities and
activities as well as the changes, set-up and ﬁnish conditions to include parts of
the experimental system (in the sense ofRheinberger [1997]). In other words, the
artiﬁcially prepared materials such as the heavy nitrogen source as well as the
characteristic manipulations and measurement devices used in the experiment
also qualify as parts of a mechanism—the experimental mechanism. While
physiological mechanisms occur in nature, experimental mechanisms require
interventions.
In order to motivate this move a little, note that it makes perfect sense to
speak of the mechanism that produced the UV absorption bands in Meselson
and Stahl’s experimental setup. This mechanism includes the heavy nitrogen
added to the growth medium, as well as the transfer of the growing bacteria
into a medium containing light nitrogen. Furthermore, the mechanism in-
cludes the mechanical devices used to grind up the cells, extract the DNA, and
transfer them onto the CsCl gradient (which, needless to say, is also part of the
mechanism).
What is also important is that the physiological mechanism—i.e., the mech-
anism of DNA replication in this case—was somehow embedded in the ex-
perimental mechanism. In other words, it was responsible for some of the
regular changes that constituted the experimental mechanism. Mechanisms
often form hierarchical structures where particular entities and activities can
be themselves decomposed into lower-level mechanisms (Craver and Darden
[2001]). The lower-level mechanisms may be responsible for some of the activ-
ities that feature in higher-level mechanisms. But such a hierarchical organiza-
tion is not necessary. Mechanisms may be related by one mechanism providing
13 The term ‘mechanism’ is sometimes used in a double sense in this literature, sometimes ontological
and sometimes epistemic. In my view, the latter use should be understood as shorthand for
‘description of a mechanism’ or ‘model of a mechanism’ and the context should normally make
it clear as to which of the two senses is relevant.
14 Lipton ([2004], p. 122) cites ‘mechanism’ as an ‘explanatory virtue’ (along with precision, scope,
simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, and ﬁt with background beliefs), but the examples he discusses
involve mostly just the identiﬁcation of causal factors rather than the elucidation of elaborate
mechanisms.
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the substrate that another mechanism operates on. Biochemical pathways are
a nice example for this. Thus, mechanisms may be horizontally linked. Such
horizontal links exist in our present example: the heavy nitrogen is an entity
of the experimental mechanism, and it is a substrate on which the physiolog-
ical mechanism can act if it is provided instead of the usual substrate (i.e.,
light nitrogen). This entity has the same activity (or almost the same) within
the physiological mechanism, but a different activity within the experimental
mechanism. Finally, an important way for mechanisms to be embedded is by
the physiological mechanism being a stage of the experimental mechanism. In
other words, a product of the physiological mechanism (here: DNA) is further
processed by the experimental mechanism.
We do not have to require that the embedded mechanism and the physiolog-
ical mechanism that is under study are exactly the same.15 It might be enough
if something similar to the physiological mechanism is embedded, provided
that the embedded mechanism shares the salient nomological properties of the
physiological mechanism. In experimental biology, mechanisms often come in
families that may bear more or less resemblance to some prototype (Schaffner
[1993], pp. 97–8). However, in this case, I think we can really say that the physio-
logical mechanism itself was embedded. After all, we are dealing with an in vivo
experiment. In other words, the experiment was done with living bacteria—at
least before their DNA was extracted.
Of course, it must be assumed that the experimental mechanism is well
understood by the experimenters. Generally, experimental mechanisms may
be expected to be more accessible epistemically because, unlike physiological
mechanisms, they were at least in part designed by the experimenter. But some
of the assumptions made about experimental mechanisms may also be subject
to independent test (see Section 6.4).
Why this extension of the notion ofmechanism?What I would like to suggest
is that the experimental mechanism is part of the explanation for the actual
data patterns that Meselson and Stahl saw in their experiment (as shown in
Figure 3). Further, I want to claim that this explanation is better than the two
alternative explanations that involve the dispersive or conservative replication
mechanism instead of the semi-conservative one. The experimental mechanism
in combination with the semi-conservative physiological mechanism is the best
explanation for the banding patterns obtained byMeselson andStahl, at least in
the groupof experimentalmechanisms that involve either the semi-conservative,
the dispersive or the conservative mechanism and are otherwise identical. I
will argue now that this explanatory relation is constitutive for the inductive
support that theMeselson–Stahl experiment bestowedon the semi-conservative
hypothesis.
15 I owe this point to an anonymous referee.
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6.2 Explaining the data
In order to make this claim good, I need to be more speciﬁc what exactly IBE
is. Lipton ([2004], pp. 58–9) has made a strong case for construing IBE as
inference to the loveliest potential explanation. The relevant potential explana-
tions are explanations that, if they were true, would explain the premises of
the inference. (Actual explanations are actually true). The loveliest explanation
is the one that, if true, would be most explanatory. Lipton also characterises
the loveliest explanation as the one that provides ‘the most understanding.’
This should not be taken to imply that explanatoriness is a purely subjective
or psychological matter, as it were, ‘in the eye of the beholder.’ Whether or
not a set of propositions are explanatory with regard to some other set is a
matter of their conforming to certain norms such as those of the mechanistic
approach taken here. Thus, I do not mean ‘loveliness’, ‘explanatory’ and ‘un-
derstand’ in a psychological sense (i.e., as some subjective state of mind), but
in a sense that is bound to strict normative standards as to what qualiﬁes as an
explanation. According to the mechanistic account that I adopt, to understand
a phenomenon is a cognitive state characterized by an acquaintance with the
entities and activities as well as certain patterns of counterfactual dependence
(see Woodward [2002]) involved in producing the explanandum phenomenon,
in particular insofar as it instantiates regularities.
The loveliest explanation should be conceptually distinguished from the
likeliest explanation, which is the one that is most likely to be true. While likely
explanations arewhat scientists strive for, to suggest that they infer explanations
on the basis of their likeliness would be ‘like a dessert recipe that says start with
a soufﬂe´’ (Lipton [2004], p. 59). How likely an explanation is to be true is
what we don’t know when we are drawing an inductive inference; what we can
know is only how explanatory or lovely an explanation would be if it were true.
On Lipton’s account, IBE is based on the idea that explanatory loveliness is a
guide or a reliable indicator to likeliness. It is often enough the case that some
complex state of affairs or some contrast (Lipton [2004], pp. 33–6) has some
speciﬁc cause rather than another. A footprint in the wilderness that is exactly
shaped like a bear paw is more likely to have been caused by a passing bear
than, say, by surface air turbulence. That’s why it is recommended to infer the
presence of a bear rather than some unusual turbulence when seeing such a
structure in the wild. The passing bear is the loveliest explanation for the shape
of the prints. Of course, the prints might have been caused by someone who
was trying to pull a prank, but nobody claims that IBE is infallible.
The next step must be to specify what the relevant explanandum is, that is,
the premise of the IBE. In contrast to other accounts, I suggest that the ex-
planandum is provided by the data rather than the phenomena (in the sense
of Bogen and Woodward [1988]). Applied to the present case, this means that
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the semi-conservative hypothesis was the loveliest potential explanation of the
data that Meselson and Stahl obtained, i.e., the banding pattern that they ob-
served (see Figure 3). According to themechanistic account of explanation that
I adopt for the purposes of this analysis, a lovely explanation is a description of
a mechanism, in other words, an arrangement of interlocking causal processes
that together produce the explanandum facts.
It is central to my account that—unlike in Lipton—the explanandum that
serves as a premise for the IBE are data, not phenomena. According to Wood-
ward ([2000], p. S163), phenomena are ‘stable repeatable effects or processes
that are potential objects of prediction and systematic explanation by general
theories and which can serve as evidence for such theories’, while data are
‘public records (. . .) produced by measurement and experiment, that serve as
evidence for the existence of phenomena.’ Phenomena and data are not re-
lated by relations of entailment, but by a hodgepodge of factual, empirical
relations.16
In the realm of experimental biology, we need to reﬁne these characteriza-
tions a little, because there are hardly any general theories. Instead, there are
descriptions of mechanisms that serve the explanatory role of theories. Thus,
for the case in hand, the phenomenon is the copying of DNAwhile the data are
the banding patterns observed by Meselson and Stahl. Phenomena and data
are causally connected through the experimental mechanism (see Section 6.1).
In our current example, the phenomenon—DNA copying—is potentially ex-
plained by all three replication mechanisms. Give or take some theoretical
difﬁculties such as the ‘problem of untwiddling’, the three proposed mech-
anism schemes are about equally successful in explaining the phenomenon.
Thus, the experimental IBE is not helping at this level. Where the experimental
IBE argument comes into the picture is in that the experimental mechanism
that contains the semi-conservative scheme provides the best explanation for
the experimental data. The semi-conservative scheme augmented with the de-
tails of the experimental setup describes a collection of causal processes that
can produce the UV absorption bands as they were observed by Meselson and
Stahl, given their background knowledge about equilibrium sedimentation (see
Section 6.4) and the biochemistry of nucleic acids. The alternative schemes in
combination with the details of the experimental setup describe causal pro-
cesses that would produce different banding patterns, unless they are ﬁtted
with additional assumptions that are not part of the physiological mechanism
(see Section 6.3). This is why the semi-conservative scheme, together with the
16 There is much that I agree with in Woodward’s account concerning the relationship between
data and phenomena. The only amendment that I would suggest is that inferences from data are
sometimes guided by considerations of what mechanism(s) would explain speciﬁc data outcomes.
This can help scientists to determine how reliably the data track competing claims about what
causes the phenomenon in question.
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details of the experimental mechanism, is the best explanation of the data and,
ultimately, the reason why this experiment provided strong support for the
semi-conservative hypothesis.17
I will show next that the account just outlined succeeds where the other
approaches discussed in Sections 4–5 failed, namely, in solving the problem of
untested auxiliaries.
6.3 IBE and the problem of untested auxiliaries
Meselson’s and Stahl’s data seemed to ﬁt the semi-conservative hypothesis best,
but, as we have seen, this judgment relied on the truth of auxiliary assumptions,
in particular that the bands corresponded to simple DNA double strands (see
Figures 4 and 5). As this assumption (together with some others) was not yet
testable in 1957, how can we nonetheless justify the claim that the experiment
spoke of the truth of the Watson–Crick hypothesis of replication, a judgment
shared by many scientists at that time? I will argue now that IBE can be used
to justify such a claim.
What needs to be shown is that the Meselson–Stahl experiment supported
the semi-conservative hypothesis by its own wits, that is, without the help of
additional tests that ruled out possible errors in the interpretation of the data
(except the calibration of the instrument; see Section 6.4). I suggest that this is
the case because the semi-conservative mechanism, in combination with what
I have called the experimental mechanism, was sufﬁcient to explain the data
by its own wits. In contrast, the alternative mechanisms would require add-
on mechanisms or ‘epicycles’ in order to explain the Meselson–Stahl data.
It would be utterly mysterious if, for example, the conservative mechanism
would produce end-to-end associations of heavy and light DNA molecules,
which could give rise to the pattern of bands that was actually observed (see
Figure 2). With the semi-conservative mechanism, in contrast, it is absolutely
clear why it is likely to produce this banding pattern; nothing is left mysterious.
This is exactly the kind of difference that IBE is sensitive to.
17 An anonymous referee asked why it is not enough to say that the semi-conservative hypothesis
predicted the outcome observed, and that it was supported by this outcome for this reason. To
answer this question, it must ﬁrst be noted that ‘predict’ is ambiguous in this context; it can mean
either ‘imply’, or it can refer to what is known as ‘novel prediction.’ In either sense, prediction
does not capture the methodological import of Meselson’s and Stahl’s data. The hypothesis did
not entail the data (as the hypothetico-deductive account of conﬁrmation would have it); rather,
hypothesis and data were connected by factual, empirical relations (seeWoodward [2000]). As for
the second sense of ‘predict,’ we may have an example of a novel prediction here, although ‘novel’
can also mean different things. In any case, novelty cannot be the reason why the experiment
supported the Watson–Crick hypothesis either, for it would have supported it no less if the latter
hypothesis had been formulated after the experiment had been performed. In fact, the evidential
support would have been just the same even if the hypothesis had been deliberately designed to
ﬁt the Meselson–Stahl data. This is why I think that the methodologically salient relation here
is that the hypothesis, combined with the experimental mechanism, explained the data (see also
Achinstein [2001]). Prediction is too heterogeneous a category from amethodological perspective.
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This explanatory sufﬁciency, I suggest, is the methodologically relevant dif-
ference between the semi-conservative and the alternative schemes and the
reason why the experiment supported the former but not the latter. Thus, the
point is not that the semi-conservative mechanism was simpler or required
fewer assumptions than the alternatives; what is crucial is that it was able to
explain the data pattern at all.
The same point can be put as follows. It is as if the auxiliary assumptionswere
hitching a free inferential ride on the experimental mechanism, powered by the
latter’s explanatory force. Because the hypothesis under test is augmented by
certain auxiliary assumptions in explaining the data, the IBE supports these
assumptions along with the hypothesis. In order to elaborate on this idea, I
shall make use of Norton’s ([1993]) notion of relocating inductive risk. Norton
discusses a case from the history of quantum physics where inductive risk was
relocated from rules to premises such that the evidence uniquely determined
a theoretical claim. In a somewhat similar way, I suggest, we can think of the
inference from the Meselson–Stahl data to the semi-conservative hypothesis as
dividing the inductive risk equally between the hypothesis itself and some of
the auxiliary assumptions needed to connect the former to the data, in par-
ticular the assumption that the bands represent single DNA duplexes. Instead
of requiring that this auxiliary assumption be secured before or independently
of the inference to the theoretical hypothesis in question, we can say that both
are inferred in one fell swoop on the grounds that the combination of them—in
form of the experimental mechanism—provides a sufﬁcient causal-mechanical
explanation of the data. In other words, the experimental mechanism is in-
ferred from the data by IBE as a whole structure.18 Because it contains the
semi-conservative mechanism as a substructure, the latter is inferred along,
but so are the auxiliary assumptions (which were of little theoretical interest
themselves).
The reason why this solves the problem of untested auxiliaries is that there is
no comparable inference to the alternative hypotheses. Even though there are
ways of ﬁddling with the auxiliaries to make them consistent with the data, this
will not provide a sufﬁcient mechanistic explanation of them. This can best be
seen in the case of Stent’s conservative hypothesis. As I already mentioned, this
hypothesis can be made consistent with the Meselson–Stahl data by assuming
that the DNA duplexes somehow stick together after replication, for example,
as end-to-end covalent associations of newly synthesized and parental poly-
phosphodeoxyribose nucleotide. Why can we not say that this assumption was
also taken for a free ride by the conservative mechanism, in the same way in
18 There were also aspects of the mechanism that were not subject to this inference, for example, the
Watson–Crick structure of the DNA double helix. Such theoretical assumptions are not involved
in this sharing of inductive risk.
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which the semi-conservative scheme took the assumption that the bands were
single duplexes along in explaining the data?19
The reason is that there is nothing in, say, the conservative hypothesis that
says that themolecules should remain so associated (see Figure 2). The assump-
tion that the bands represented simple DNA double helices is part of a lovely
explanation of the data (in the mechanistic sense), while the assumption that
the bands represent end-to-end associations of parental and newly synthesized
double strands is not part of such a lovely explanation. It is not clear why the
alternative replication schemes should produce such structures. Of course, this
does not mean that the alternative explanations are ruled out with certainty.
But, once again, nobody claims that IBE is an infallible inference rule. No
inductive inference rule is infallible. Proponents of IBE do not claim that the
loveliest explanation is always true; they only say that this is the case often
enough for this rule to be epistemically useful. Our present case is certainly no
counter-instance.
It seems to me that only such an IBE-type of argument can make sense
of the widely shared intuition (see Franklin [2007], Section E.2; Roush [2005],
pp. 14–6) that theMeselson–Stahl data provided strongdiscriminatory evidence
for the semi-conservative hypothesis. As I have shown, two other approaches
to reconstructing the scientiﬁc reasoning behind ‘the most beautiful experi-
ment in biology’ succumb to Duhem’s ﬁrst problem, or its inductive analogue.
The merits of a third approach to scientiﬁc inference in reconstructing this
case—Bayesian conﬁrmation theory—will be discussed in Section 8. But ﬁrst,
I want to demonstrate that an IBE-type argument can also be applied to those
auxiliary assumptions that were actually tested.
6.4 IBE-turtles all the way down
Not all auxiliary assumptions used by Meselson and Stahl were free riders in
the sense explained in the previous section. The main example of such a free
rider was the identiﬁcation of the bands with single DNA duplexes (Figures 4
and 5). However, even if this is granted, Meselson’s and Stahl’s evidence could
only have been as good as the correlation between the density of the DNA
and the position of the bands. As we have seen, it was crucially important that
the band of intermediate density was lying exactly between the heavy and light
bands. But how good was Meselson and Stahl’s analytic technique to resolve
molecules according to their density? Franklin ([2007], Section E.2) argues
19 This objection is due to an anonymous referee. Note that my notion of ‘inferential hitch-hiking’
is not a new methodological principle; it is merely a way of describing how IBE operates in a
case like this, where the explanation inferred is not a single proposition or a systematic theory
but a heterogeneous assemblage of theoretical and experimental assumptions (the experimental
mechanism).
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that the mere fact that heavy and light DNA produced two clearly separated
bands (before the actual experiment was done) provided some evidence that the
technique was reliable. I agree, except that the linearity of the gradient was an
important extra element in the argument that the intermediate contained 14N
and 15N in equal amounts. Therefore, a good calibration of the instrument was
of the essence for this experiment. For this reason, I want to brieﬂy examine
how this was done.
The theory of ultracentrifugation had been worked out to a large extent by
Theodor Svedberg in the 1920s. In his PhD thesis, MatthewMeselson extended
the work of Svedberg to experiments with solutions of very high density, such
as the CsCl-gradients that they were using. In those days, molecular biology
was institutionally closely associated with physics and physical chemistry (im-
pressively, Meselson’s thesis committee included Richard Feynman and Linus
Pauling). Meselson investigated in particular the conditions under which a
CsCl-gradient and the macromolecules that ﬂoat in it would reach a point of
equilibrium. At equilibrium, the centrifugal force and the buoyant force would
balance each other, tending to keep the DNA at that point where its buoyant
density equals that of the solution. But there is another force that tends to dis-
place the DNA from this equilibrium: namely molecular diffusion or Brownian
motion. Meselson was able to show theoretically that, at equilibrium, these op-
posing forces would generate a Gaussian distribution of the molecules. Here is
the relationship that Meselson derived:
CPXn (r ) = CPXn (r0) exp
−(r − r0)2
2σ 2
This equation describes the concentration of a charged polymer such as
DNA in a linear density gradient. This is a Gaussian distribution with standard
deviation σ . Meselson also obtained the following expression for the standard
deviation:
σ 2 = RT
MPXn v¯PXn (dρ/dr )r0ω2r0
where MPXn is the molecular weight of the polymer PXn ; v¯PXn is the partial spe-
ciﬁc volume of the polymer PXn ; (dρ/dr )r0 is the slope of the density gradient;
ω is the angular velocity; and r is the distance from the rotation axis.
The width of the distribution therefore allowed the biologists to calculate
the molecular weight of the bands. The physical reason for this is that lighter
molecules diffuse more rapidly; therefore they will smear more strongly when
they form a band.
Meselson and Stahl checked these theoretical results against their experi-
mental data, using DNA from bacteriophage T4 as a marker. The agreement
was quite remarkable (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Agreement of the theoretical calculation with the measured DNA con-
centration at equilibrium. The DNA used in this experiment was derived from
bacteriophage T4. This ﬁgure appeared only in Meselson’s PhD thesis (Meselson
[1957]), not in the 1958 publication. Reprinted with author’s permission.
This clean result may be viewed as a test that the measuring device worked
properly and that the gradient was almost perfectly linear over a certain range.
Thus, distances from the centre of rotation translate directly into buoyant den-
sities. This linear CsCl gradient was an important part of what I have called the
experimental mechanism, which is the centrepiece of my IBE-based reconstruc-
tion of the experiment. I would like to call the theory of how centrifugation
produces a linear gradient from which the density of molecules that ﬂoat in it
can be read off directly the theory of the instrument. The ﬁnal question to be
discussed in this section is how this theory of the instrument was conﬁrmed.
My proposed answer to this last question is that the theory of the instrument
was also supported by an IBE-type argument, and that explanation is best
understood in the mechanistic sense. Here, the relevant experimental mecha-
nism contains the DNA molecules, the caesium and chloride ions, as well as
the water molecules. These entities interact by electrostatic forces and weak
chemical bonds (hydrogen bonds). Further, this experimental mechanism in-
volves the centrifuge itself with its rotor and the cell containing the DNA/CsCl
solution. Together with physical laws20 (Newton’s laws, Coulomb’s law, and the
laws of thermodynamics), this mechanism explains why, under suitable condi-
tions, DNA molecules will reach a sedimentation equilibrium, in which they
are distributed in accordance with a Gauss curve where the mean is a linear
20 Some proponents of a mechanistic account of explanation have argued that laws are redundant;
all the explanatory work they were once thought to do can be captured by activities (Machamer,
Darden, and Craver [2000]). I have criticised this view in a previous work (Weber [2005],
Chapter 2). Woodward ([2002]) gives an account of mechanisms based on his counterfactual
account of causal regularities. These differences are of no relevance for the present discussion.
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function of density and the width an inversely linear function of molecular
weight, which is what was actually observed. It is this explanatory relation
that provided grounds for thinking that the analytic ultracentrifuge is a reliable
instrument for determining the density of certain biopolymers. In other words,
it’s IBE-turtles all the way down.
7 Van Fraassen’s ‘Bad Lot’ Argument
In the previous section, I have shown how the IBE approach combined with a
mechanistic account of explanation solves the inductive analogue to Duhem’s
ﬁrst problem. But we still have Duhem’s second problem to cope with, which
is the claim that scientists can never have rational grounds for believing that
the set of available hypotheses includes one that is true. There is a more recent
version of this argument that pertains directly to IBE, namely van Fraassen’s
‘bad lot’ objection (van Fraassen [1989], p. 142ff.). According to this argument,
IBE can perhaps rank a set of hypotheses with regard to their explanatory
merits, but it cannot provide grounds for accepting one of them as true. For the
best explanation could still be a very bad one; it affords no epistemic distinction
to be the best of a bad lot.
The most direct way of answering this challenge would be to show that the
list of alternatives was, in fact, exhaustive. This is what Roush ([2005], p. 15)
suggests in her brief discussion of the Meselson–Stahl case:
It is hard to argue with the claim that all, some, or none of an original
strand appears in a daughter molecule, and all, some or none exhaust the
possibilities. The genius of the investigation, perhaps, was to have pitched
the question at a level of description where this exhaustiveness could be
achieved in a simple way.
According to Roush, the level of description chosen in this case rules out
that there are alternatives that have not been considered. If she were right,
this would be a direct counterexample to van Fraassen’s and Duhem’s claims
that there are always unconsidered alternatives (see Section 2). In a similar vein,
JohnNorton ([1993]) has argued that there are theoretical claims in physics that
are completely determined by a body of evidence. Might something like this
work here as well? Unfortunately, I do not think so. Roush’s argument for the
exhaustiveness of the three replication schemes is not successful; there are other
conceivable schemes.For example, it is at least logically possible that the original
molecule is degraded completely in the process; in other words, that both
molecules are newly synthesized.21 There are other conceivable alternatives.22
21 I wish to thank Eric Oberheim for pointing this possibility out to me.
22 One could also think ofmechanisms that use some kind of intermediate (e.g., RNAor protein) for
copying the DNA molecule. To use an analogy, in the early days of molecular biology, there were
44 Marcel Weber
To be sure, such a mechanism is not supported by Meselson and Stahl’s data,
but it is enough to cast doubt on the exhaustiveness of the list of alternatives.
Even though Roush’s formulation (‘all, some or none of an original strand’)
makes it look as if there were a complete disjunction involved, this is a result
of an ambiguity in this way of describing the alternatives. We will thus have to
settle with something weaker than a complete disjunction.
At least Roush’s argument points us in the right direction. The three hy-
potheses about DNA replication might not exhaust the space of all possible
replication mechanisms, but they may be the only ones that satisfy certain
mechanistic constraints. All three schemes of DNA replication had to incor-
porate some quite stringent constraints. Most importantly, the schemes had
to explain how DNA molecules with the same nucleotide sequence as an ex-
isting molecule could be synthesized. Thus, explanatory considerations were
already involved in the construction of the various hypotheses. This ﬁts nicely
with Lipton’s ([2004]) two-ﬁlter strategy, according to which the generation of
a number of ‘live options’ of candidate hypotheses is followed by a selection
of the ‘loveliest’ one and where explanatory considerations enter at all stages
of the research process, i.e., in both ‘ﬁlters.’ The main difference to my account
is that I propose to base these explanatory considerations on a mechanistic
account of explanation.
This mechanism-based view puts very stringent constraints23 on what quali-
ﬁes as a live option. Suitable candidate hypothesesmust incorporate a consider-
able body of knowledge from organic chemistry and molecular biology. In my
example, the double helix model was such a constraint. It incorporated a great
body of knowledge from organic chemistry, the physical chemistry of colloids,
and crystallography. Furthermore, it was already fairly clear at that time that
the sequence of bases in DNA was biologically highly signiﬁcant (see Crick
[1958], who could already cite a considerable body of evidence that supported
this idea). Therefore, the replication mechanism had to preserve the nucleotide
sequence of DNA. The complementarity of base pairing provided a lovely ex-
planation for how a mechanism of DNA synthesis could achieve this. Hence, it
was set that either single- or double-stranded DNA had to serve as a template
ideas around that proteins are assembled directly on the DNA molecule (Gamow’s ‘diamond’
hypothesis). Later, it was shown that protein synthesis requires RNA as an intermediate (Judson
[1979], p. 252). The hypothesis that DNA replication might require an intermediate was, to my
knowledge, never seriously entertained; but it cannot be ruled out a priori, which makes our case
vulnerable to Duhem’s and van Fraassen’s arguments.
23 A detailed list of such mechanistic constraints can be found in (Craver [2007], Chapter 3, Sec-
tion 2). He distinguishes componency constraints (given by the stock of available entities), spatial
constraints (pertaining to the possible spatial organization of mechanisms), temporal constraints
(time courses and necessary sequences of events), and active constraints (given by invariant re-
lationships between intervention variables). I would add in particular functional constraints, i.e.,
considerations on what biological task the mechanismmust perform (here: copying of the genetic
material).
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for the (then still putative) DNA polymerase. Indeed, all the three major repli-
cation mechanisms that were considered as live options during the mid-1950s
incorporated this template idea. The great open questions were whether the
template was single- or double stranded, and the extent to which the template
was conserved in the process.
Thus, background knowledge imposed a set of mechanistic constraints on
the space of possible solutions to the replication problem. There was simply no
alternative that could satisfy all these constraints and explain the Meselson–
Stahl data by their own wits. Only the Watson–Crick model passed both of
these IBE-ﬁlters—this, I suggest, is what made this experiment so compelling.
Possibly, many alleged ‘crucial experiments’ in and out of biology owe their
strength to this kind of logic.
8 IBE and Bayesianism
So far, I have argued that IBEdoes a better job in reconstructing ‘themost beau-
tiful experiment in biology’ than eliminative induction and the error-statistical
approach to scientiﬁc inference. In this last section, I want to show that the
IBE approach is not in conﬂict with the current mainstream theory (or family
of theories) of conﬁrmation, which, of course, is Bayesianism. Okasha ([2000])
and Lipton ([2004], Chapter 7) have already shown that IBE need not be in
conﬂict with Bayesian constraints on personal degrees of belief. That is, pro-
ponents of IBE need in no way challenge the Bayesian’s credo that the only
rational way of assigning probabilities to hypotheses that are subject to em-
pirical conﬁrmation is by conditionalizing on the evidence in accordance with
Bayes’s theorem. But this does not make IBE superﬂuous. Far from it, IBE
can provide a way of realizing the Bayesian formalism in concrete cases. The
formalism as such makes no prescriptions as to how the prior probabilities
and likelihoods ought to be set; it only says that once these have been set, the
posterior probabilities are set as well, on pain of incoherence. This is quite a
weak constraint. What IBE can do here is to provide some further constraints,
for example, on the prior probabilities and likelihoods themselves. Sometimes,
estimating how likely a hypothesis makes some piece of evidence, that is, esti-
mating p(e|h), might involve considerations as to whether h is able to explain e.
In our present idiom, this means that there must be a mechanism whereby the
state of affairs described in e is produced and where this mechanism, or parts
of it, are described by h. Furthermore, explanatory considerations may be used
to set prior probabilities, on which Bayesianism imposes no constraints.
This way of reconciling IBE andBayesianism is not new.What I would like to
do, brieﬂy, is to show how the present case study illuminates this reconciliation
and thus adds credibility to it.
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The semi-conservative mechanism does not entail the Meselson–Stahl re-
sults; as I have argued (Section 6.1) the two are connected by the factual
assumptions that describe the experimental mechanism. Since this mechanism
is plausible given the background knowledge (see Section 7), we could say that
its description h bestows a high probability on e (the banding pattern observed).
Since no comparable mechanism explains e given the other hypotheses, we can
say that the latter make e less likely. Assuming that the hypotheses do not differ
too much in prior probability, this already means that the semi-conservative
hypotheses had a higher posterior probability after the experiment was done.
Alternatively, it could be argued that explanatory considerations afford the
semi-conservative scheme with the most favourable likelihood ratio (Roush
[2005]).
What is the advantage of supplementing the Bayesian account with explana-
tory considerations in this manner? I suggest that, in addition to providing
a way of assigning likelihoods, IBE can also illuminate Bayesian solutions
to Duhem’s problem. Some Bayesians have argued that untested auxiliary
assumptions could still have a prior probability that is sufﬁciently high to
allow conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation of a hypothesis under test, thus tak-
ing the sting out of Duhem’s problem (Dorling [1979]). The problem with
this approach is that it implies that most experimental tests will only be con-
clusive for some people (namely, those who give a high prior probability to
all the auxiliaries) and not for others, which is undesirable. Here, IBE can
help: Explanatory considerations such as those discussed in Section 6.3 can be
used to set bounds for belief in the auxiliaries, thus rendering evidence more
objective.
9 Conclusions
I have argued that an experimentalist version of IBE permits a reconstruc-
tion of the Meselson–Stahl experiment according to which the latter provided
decisive veridical evidence (Achinstein [2001]) for the semi-conservative hy-
pothesis, while the two alternatives remained without such support. This is
pretty close to what crucial experiments were always supposed to do, except
that I am of course not claiming that such an experimental demonstration
can reach the apodictic certainty of deduction (as Duhem required, see Sec-
tion 2). In contrast, eliminative induction and the severe-testing approach fail
to exhibit the evidential support of the experiment for the semi-conservative
hypothesis.
In contrast to Lipton’s ([2004]) account of IBE, I have used a mechanistic
account of explanation. An advantage of such an account is that it does justice
to actual explanations inmolecular biology. Another advantage is that it makes
explanation an objective relation between explanans and explanandum, which
Duhem’s Problems and IBE 47
means that the evidential relation can also be objective. I have also introduced
the notion of an experimental mechanism, which is like the physiological mech-
anisms discussed by philosophers of biology and neuroscience, except that it
includes experimental manipulations, instruments and artiﬁcially created en-
tities and activities. Experimental mechanisms connect data and phenomena
via causal processes. Physiological mechanisms are embedded in experimental
mechanisms. This notion allows IBE to be extended to show how inferences
can be drawn from experimental data such as the banding patterns observed in
an analytic ultracentrifuge.
Finally, I have shown that the two predicaments that Duhem identiﬁed for
crucial experiments (though on the assumption that all inferences would have
to be deductive) as well as van Fraassen’s well-known ‘bad lot’-objection to
IBE can be solved in the IBE-based framework that I have used. As regards
Duhem’s ﬁrst problem, the experimentalist variant of IBE allows (fallible) infer-
ences to hypotheses about mechanisms even if there are untested experimental
assumptions.24 The crucial move is the recognition that an experimental mech-
anism containing untested auxiliaries that is sufﬁcient for explaining the data
is better supported by these data than schemes that are not sufﬁcient. As it
were, the untested auxiliaries hitch a free inferential ride on the experimental
mechanism. In addition to the free riders, there were experimental assumptions
that were actually tested in this case, and these tests also involved IBE.
Van Fraassen’s ‘bad lot’ problem (which I take to be basically Duhem’s sec-
ond problem as applied to ampliative instead of deductive inference) can be
handled by showing how an extensive body of background knowledge provided
a host of stringent material constraints on the candidate hypotheses.
Mechanistic-explanatory considerations are involved in the construction of
such candidates as well as in the selection of the best one by a crucial experi-
mental test.
Finally, I have shown that this case study strengthens the view that propo-
nents of IBE and Bayesians can be friends.
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